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Abstract
People increasingly turn to the Internet when they have a
medical condition. The data they create during this process is
a valuable source for medical research and for future health
services. However, utilizing these data could come at a cost
to user privacy. Thus, it is important to balance the perceived
value that users assign to these data with the value of the ser-
vices derived from them.
Here we describe experiments where methods from Mech-
anism Design were used to elicit a truthful valuation from
users for their Internet data and for services to screen peo-
ple for medical conditions. In these experiments, 880 people
from around the world were asked to participate in an auc-
tion to provide their data for uses differing in their contri-
bution to the participant, to society, and in the disease they
addressed. Some users were offered monetary compensation
for their participation, while others were asked to pay to par-
ticipate.
Our findings show that 99% of people were willing to con-
tribute their data in exchange for monetary compensation and
an analysis of their data, while 53% were willing to pay to
have their data analyzed. The average perceived value users
assigned to their data was estimated at US$49. Their value to
screen them for a specific cancer was US$22 while the value
of this service offered to the general public was US$22. Par-
ticipants requested higher compensation when notified that
their data would be used to analyze a more severe condition.
They were willing to pay more to have their data analyzed
when the condition was more severe, when they had higher
education or if they had recently experienced a serious medi-
cal condition.
Our findings show that it is possible to place a monetary value
on health-related uses of highly personal data. Such uses are
valued by users and their value is approximately half that of
their data. Our methodology can be extended to other areas
where sensitive data may be exchanged for services to indi-
viduals and to society, while our results suggest that future
services utilizing individual’s Internet data could be viable.
1 Introduction
Data is a valuable asset for organizations in a data-driven
economy (Dewar 2017), but data holders can abuse this as-
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set, one result of which is the possible breach of an indi-
vidual’s privacy. In response to the latter and to other issues
stemming from amassing data by companies, the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which
came into effect in May 2018 gives control to individuals
over their personal data (eugdpr.org), thus attempting to shift
the balance between the value of data for individuals and for
enterprises.
Though it is evident that data has value, quantifying it
is difficult. In the past, researchers have attempted to put a
monetary value that individuals assign to their photos (Car-
rascal and de Oliveira 2013), browsing (Carrascal and de
Oliveira 2013), data from home appliances (Kugler 2018)
and location (Danezis, Lewis, and Anderson 2005). Ad-
ditionally, researchers have proposed active choice models
which offer users the option of payment through monetary
transactions or through disclosure of personal information
(Malgieri and Custers 2018).
One area where the value of the data has not been mea-
sured is healthcare. This is a major lacunae because health-
care is, arguably, the area in which data has the highest value
to individuals. One the one hand, the high value is due to the
potential for damage if privacy is breached, and on the other
hand, for companies and individuals, because of the poten-
tial uses for creating new screening, treatment, and insights
from data.
In recent years data from online services has proven a
boon for medical research. For example, the website Pa-
tientsLikeMe (www.patientslikeme.com) lets people who
are suffering from one of a number of diseases connect with
others that suffer from similar problems for social support
and for advice. The data posted by users of this site has
enabled researchers to test the efficacy of treatments which
would have been difficult to test through other methods, for
example in rare diseases such as ALS (Wicks et al. 2011).
Another source of data from online services are people’s
queries on Internet search engines. These queries and the
interactions of users with these search engines have been
used to screen for severe medical conditions such as Parkin-
son’s disease (Allerhand et al. 2018; White, Doraiswamy,
and Horvitz 2018), ovarian and cervical cancer (Soldaini and
Yom-Tov 2017), lung cancer (White and Horvitz 2017), pan-
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creatic cancer (Paparrizos, White, and Horvitz 2016) and di-
abetes (Hochberg et al. 2019). Similarly, social media post-
ings have been used to predict depression (De Choudhury
et al. 2013) and diagnose autism (Ben-Sasson and Yom-Tov
2016).
Thus, people’s data in online services can be used to cre-
ate new medical services, e.g., screening tests for disease,
but these data could potentially compromise individual pri-
vacy. Therefore, it is important to assess the value people
assign to these data, vis-a-vis the value they perceive to be
gained from such novel services.
We note that the value of these services need not be lim-
ited to direct monetary value to the individual. People are of-
ten willing to donate money, time, effort, data (Skatova, Ng,
and Goulding 2014) and even organs (e.g., blood and kid-
neys) to help others in need, presumably in exchange for so-
cietal benefit (Misje et al. 2005), personal satisfaction (Misje
et al. 2005), or to improve their social standing (Misje et al.
2005). Thus, measurement of the value of data needs to ac-
count for the many facets of its perceived value to people,
and to offset this value with the potential harm which might
be caused by mishandling thereof.
In this paper we attempt to measure the value people as-
sign to their search queries on Google or Bing (henceforth
search logs) for medical uses.
Measuring the value of data is a difficult undertaking
because it requires eliciting a truthful value from people.
People who are asked to provide unverifiable information
may misreport their valuations if they are skewed towards
privacy, without incurring any cost. Thus, here we applied
Mechanism Design (Nisan and Ronen 2001) approaches,
utilizing two forms of auction, a reverse Vickrey auction in
one population and a Vickrey auction in another. In the re-
verse Vickrey auction we treat search logs as goods for sale,
and design an auction with multiple sellers (agents) and one
buyer (the authors of the paper). The buyer informs sellers
that he is interested in at most X units of the goods, and is
willing to pay at most r dollars for each unit; r is known as
the reserve price, and may be hidden. Each seller declares
her bid (the required price for selling the goods), and the
buyer buys X units with the lowest bids, assuming the bids
are below the reserve price and pays the minimum between
r and the X + 1 lowest bid.
Similarly, in the Vickrey auction we ask participants to
provide their search logs and demand that they pay the ex-
perimenters to analyze them. In this case, the authors are
sellers of an analysis service willing to process at most X
units of the goods (search logs), and are willing to accept
the X units offered at the highest price, if it is over r, a
minimal (possibly hidden) reserve price. The details of the
experiment and its modeling are described in Section 2.
The class of these mechanisms is dominant strategy in-
centive compatible (Vickrey 1961), meaning that it is in a
participant’s best interest to bid her honest value for the
goods, regardless of X, r or the bids declared by the other
sellers. In our study, by letting participants believe that we
are willing to pay for their information, we are guaran-
teed, theoretically, that the elicited values are truthful. Im-
portantly, we debriefed the participants after the experiment,
and that too led to interesting findings (see Section 4).
Our paper provides several contributions. First, we de-
velop a novel method for measuring and modeling the mon-
etary value of data and data services. Second, we show that
people assign a high value to health data and to health-
related services. The value of the latter is such that almost
half the people are willing to pay for these services, even
when these services are provided to the public, without di-
rect benefit to themselves. Our models suggest that the per-
ceived value of data is approximately twice as that of the
proposed health service using these data.
2 Methods
2.1 Data collection
We conducted an online assessment of the value people as-
sign to their internet search history data for its use in med-
ical purposes by running an auction / reverse auction, ex-
tracting people’s valuations for health services and data in
8 different conditions. Participants were recruited to partic-
ipate in an online questionnaire through two crowdsourc-
ing platforms, Mechanical Turk and Prolific Academic. The
two platforms differ in the demographics of the workers em-
ployed in each, their geographic reach, and the attention of
workers to the task (Peer et al. 2017). For participating in
the study, the participants who completed the questionnaire
received US$1.50.
At the beginning of the questionnaire we provided partic-
ipants with background information, stating that search logs
have been used for medical purposes.
We then requested participants to consent to participate in
the study and to provide their birth year, gender, country of
residence, level of education and yearly income. They were
also required to indicate if they have recently suffered from
a serious medical condition and/or are currently suffering
from it.
We informed participants of the stated goal of the ques-
tionnaire, which was to screen participants for further study
in which those chosen would provide their search history on
Bing and Google so that experimenters could use it towards
one of 4 goals:
1. Benign medical condition, public good: Measure and re-
port the rate of flu virus in the participant’s country.
2. Severe medical condition, public good: Develop a
model to detect thyroid cancer using their data and apply
it to people in the participant’s country.
3. Severe medical condition, personal good: Apply a
model for detection of thyroid cancer to the participant’s
data and report the result to them.
4. Severe medical condition, public and personal good:
Develop a model to detect thyroid cancer, apply it to the
participant’s data and report the result to them.
Participants were randomized into one of the 4 goals, as
well as to one of two additional conditions: Either the par-
ticipant was asked how much money (in US dollars) they
would require the experimenters to pay for their search his-
tory to be used for the stated goal or how much money par-
ticipants would pay the experimenters to use their search his-
tory for the stated goal.
Thus, each participant was randomized into one of 8 ex-
perimental conditions (4 goals, pay or be paid).
As noted above, our goal was to elicit truthful evaluations
from participants. Therefore, to check the willingness to pay,
in the experiment we used a Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961)
with hidden reserve price. In this auction the k highest bid-
ders who submitted a bid higher than a reserve price r, win
and pay the maximum between the k + 1 highest bid and r.
In our case, r is hidden.
For checking desire to be paid, in the experiment we used
a reverse Vickrey auction with hidden reserve price. In this
auction the k lowest bidders who submitted a bid lower than
a reserve price r, win and are paid the mimimum between
the k+1 lowest bid and r. Both auctions are truthful, regard-
less of the reserve price. In both auctions we used reserve
prices so that no winners will be selected; this is obtained by
having an exorbitantly high reserve price (say $10K) in the
first condition and a very low reserve price (e.g., some nega-
tive number) in the second one. While hidden reserve prices
are common practice, we also included a description of the
way they have been chosen in a debrief to the participants,
which was well accepted, as described below.
Thus, participants were informed that the study, con-
ducted by Anonymous Commercial Company (name re-
moved for anonymous review), was a first part of a two-
staged study. In the first part, the questionnaire would be
shown to 1000 people. Among those, the 100 people who
requested the smallest amount of money for their data, if
it were below a maximal threshold (or offered the largest
amount if it were above a minimum threshold, in the second
condition) would be contacted for the second stage of the
study.
Finally, because the study might be perceived as involv-
ing deception, we indicated to participants that we would
be providing a debriefing on the study after they completed
the questionnaire. Participants who indicated their interest
in receiving the debriefing and get paid US$0.10 for it were
provided with the debriefing several weeks after the study
was completed.
This study was approved by the Microsoft Institutional
Review Board. See Appendix for the full questionnaire.
Participants who read the consent form but did not want to
take part in the study and participants who did not complete
the questionnaire were removed from the data.
2.2 Modeling
Let V ipu and V
i
pr be the valuation of participant i to the goods
(public or personal, respectively), and let V iS = V
i
pu+V
i
pr be
the total value for participant i to the service. Let V iD denote
the cost for an agent in revealing his valuation (which may
have privacy implications but also other ramifications). Let
P i = V iS −V iD be the total valuation of participant i. Notice
that P i is the value to be reported if/when he/she participates
in a truth-revealing auction. Notice that under the above ter-
minology an equation of the form Pi = V iS − V iD holds
for each participant i; in the experiment in which partici-
pants are offered payments the reported bid −P i would be
non-negative and in the experiment in which participants are
asked to pay the reported bid P i would be non-negative. The
additive multi-attribute structure of utility we use is classical
in economics and the characterization of conditions justify-
ing it appears already in classical studies (Debreu 1959).
Under the assumption that VD, Vpr and Vpu are indepen-
dent and that P is a linear combination thereof, all pro-
posed transactions (questionnaire responses) can be jointly
represented using a linear model where the dependent at-
tribute is P and the independent values are indicators of
whether the service was offered in the transaction. Since
all transactions involved data, VD is present in all transac-
tions. Specifically, each transaction is in the form of P i =
V ipuX
i
pu+V
i
prX
i
pr−V iD, where Xipu and Xipr are indicators
determined by the condition that user was shown.
The linear coefficients (Xipu and X
i
pr) obtained as a so-
lution to the equations above represent the average pop-
ulation valuation for the services and for the search log.
More specifically, the obtained coefficients can be estimated
through linear regression and the bias term will thus corre-
spond to the average valuation for revelation of the search
logs.
When modeling our data to understand demographic cor-
relates therein, and to account for the skewed distribution
of the requested and offered amounts we transformed the
non-zero amounts using a log transform before modeling
them. Participant’s level of education was transformed into
a continuous number based on the number of years needed
to attain each level of education. For example, participants
that indicated high-school as their higher education level re-
ceived the number 12. Income level was transformed into
the average amount in the range, e.g., participants that in-
dicated US$15,000–US$30,000 as their yearly income level
received the number US$22,500.
3 Results
We recruited 482 participants through Mechanical Turk and
398 through Prolific Academic. Participants were success-
fully randomized into one of eight experimental conditions
(chi2 test, P = 0.47).
The average reported age of participants was 35 (s.d.: 11)
years. The reported gender of 46% was female, 54% male
(Less than 1% did not provide it). Participants reported an
average of 15 years of education (s.d.: 2). Education was
correlated with age (Spearman ρ = 0.14, P = 5 · 10−5) and
with income (Spearman ρ = 0.27, P < 10−10).
Participants from Mechanical Turk were predominantly
from the US (85%) and India (12%), whereas those from
Prolific Academic were recruited from 23 countries, the
most common being US (28%), UK (23%), and Poland
(9%).
Figures 1, 2 and 3 compare the distribution of age, ed-
ucation, and income of participants, respectively, stratified
by whether the participants were recruited from Mechani-
cal Turk or from Prolific Academic. As the figures show,
Prolific Academic participants were typically younger, with
fewer years of education and more were in the lower income
bracket.
Figure 1: Comparison of the ages of participants, by recruit-
ment platform. Prolific Academic users are shown in black
bars, and those from Mechanical Turk in gray.
Figure 2: Comparison of the education level of participants,
by recruitment platform. Prolific Academic users are shown
in black bars, and those from Mechanical Turk in gray.
We excluded 20 participants who responded in under 10
seconds to the monetary value question and another 41 par-
ticipants who offered or requested more than US$1500 (9
offered a higher amount and 32 requested a higher amount).
Thus, 819 responses (93%) were analyzed. Among 419 par-
ticipants who were asked to pay, 224 (53%) were willing to
pay more than US$0.10. Similarly, among 400 participants
who were offered money, 395 (99%) asked for more than
US$0.10. There were only small differences in willingness
to offer a non-zero value between participants from Mechan-
ical Turk and Prolific Academic, as shown in Figure 4.
The 224 users who offered a payment less than US$0.10
and the 5 users who requested less than US$0.10 should be
considered as censored users. Censoring (Dodge 2003) is
the failure to observe a variable totally, its value being re-
placed by a lower limit (right censoring), or an upper limit
(left censoring). In our case, a user who offered to pay zero
dollars might have been willing to provide their data had she
been offered payment, while a user to whom we offered pay-
Figure 3: Comparison of reported income, by recruitment
platform. Prolific Academic users are shown in black bars,
and those from Mechanical Turk in gray.
Figure 4: Willingness to provide a monetary value, defined
as a willingness to bid a non-zero value. Prolific Academic
users are shown in black bars, and those from Mechanical
Turk in gray.
ment and requested a zero amount might have been willing
to pay money for their data. However, since we only asked
each participant whether they were willing to pay or be paid,
our measurements are censored.
A logistic regression model did not find any of the demo-
graphic variables statistically significantly associated with
being censored. Henceforth we removed the censored users
in our analysis. The average value users offered to give for
analysis of their data was US$38 (s.d.: 150) and the average
value requested was US$148 (s.d.: 269). Figure 5 shows the
average bid values per question. As the figure shows, peo-
ple request a larger amount than they are willing to pay for
the service. Additionally, a larger amount is requested for
the more severe conditions, but is not offered for such con-
ditions. Strikingly, though the monetary value of public ver-
sus personal good is similar, when both are proposed people
requested significantly less money and offered slightly less
money.
As described in Section 2, it is possible to estimate the av-
erage population valuation of the data and the two services
by solving a linear regression problem. Thus, we modeled
the untransformed value of P using robust linear regression
with 1% of the largest outliers removed. The model is shown
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Figure 5: Average bid values after removing censored users.
Orange bars represent cases where participants were offered
payment and blue bars cases where they were asked to pay.
The left two bars are for the benign medical condition, while
the other bars refer to the severe medical condition.
Variable Coefficients (SE) P-value
Value of data 48.8 (12.4) 0.0002
Severity -13.9 (10.1) 0.174
Personal 22.1 (10.1) 0.028
Public 20.4 (10.1) 0.042
Table 1: Model coefficients for predicting monetary value.
Only non-censored observations are used (n=619). Model fit
is R2 = 0.25.
in Table 1. As the table shows, the monetary value people at-
tribute to their data is approximately $49. Personal and pub-
lic good are valued at approximately $21. The severity of a
condition is not statistically significantly correlated with the
value offered by participants.
We modeled the monetary value of information, sepa-
rately for participants who offered payment and those who
were offered it, excluding censored users. For each group
we constructed one model using only the experimental con-
ditions (severity and type of good) and another which uses
both these variables and demographic characteristics re-
ported by users.
Table 2 shows the model coefficients. As the table shows,
users were willing to pay more for the use of their data if
they had a higher education and if they had experienced a
severe medical condition recently. People requested a higher
compensation for their data if it were to be used to analyze
the more severe condition, and reduced their demand if it
contributed to both personal and public good.
Note that in the model we included the severity as a
variable, since it was part of the transaction. However, its
p − value was not statistically significant, indicating that it
had a negligible effect on the average population valuation.
As noted in Section 2, we offered participants a (paid)
debriefing 4 weeks after they completed the questionnaire.
Of 450 people who participated through Mechanical Turk,
363 (81%) asked to receive the debrief and 353 of 369 (96%)
Prolific participants asked for it. Because of the way that the
debrief was provided we could measure how many Prolific
participants read the debrief. We found that 326 (92%) read
it.
A few participants emailed us after the debrief. Notably,
one wrote that “[the study] totally had me fooled!”. This
would suggest that our methodology of a two-staged study
so as to elicit truthful responses, was effective.
4 Discussion
People increasingly turn to the Internet when they have
a medical condition, to diagnose it, learn about their op-
tions, and meet other people experiencing similar conditions
(Yom-Tov 2016). The data they create during this process is
a valuable source for medical research and for future health
services.
Here we show that when offered a compensation, people
demand a high price for utilization of their data for health-
related services ($149 to $182, depending on condition). The
price is higher for use in screening for a severe medical con-
dition, and is equal whether the data is used for personal or
public good. The latter can be explained by participants per-
ceiving the value of the offered service (apply an algorithm
for thyroid cancer detection to their data) as mostly useful
for research, not for the individual. Interestingly, when both
services are offered, people request less than half the price
of each separately.
More than half (53%) of participants were willing to pay
the experimenters, in addition to providing their data. Higher
value was offered for a service examining the severe medi-
cal condition and to personal good (over public good). Strik-
ingly, a lower payment was offered if both goods were sat-
isfied. Higher education and a recent experience of a serious
medical condition were associated with higher payment.
When jointly modeled through a linear model described
in Section 2, the value of public and personal good (Vpu and
Vpr) were found to be similar, at approximately US$21. In
contrast, the perceived value of search logs was estimated at
approximately US$49. Thus, the value of search logs (VD)
for health uses (as outlined in the questionnaire) is signif-
icantly higher than the value of search logs for other uses,
as estimated in a previous study (25 Euro, approximately
US$28) (Carrascal and de Oliveira 2013). Interestingly, the
value of the two services together is roughly equal to that of
the valuation of the data. This means that it would be possi-
ble for a service provider to obtain the needed data to create
her service for the cost of offering the public and the individ-
ual screening tests, with little or no monetary compensation
to users.
There are several limitations in the way that the goal of
data use was mentioned. First, we examined willingness to
pay or be paid for a single service. In a real-life applica-
tion users might be offered screening for multiple diseases,
which may increase the perceived value to participants. Ad-
ditionally, we did not specify if our request for data was a
one-time request or for ongoing access, nor the retrospec-
tive length of time that the data would be accessed. Future
research will examine the effect of these variables on the
valuation of the data and the offered services.
Variable User Pays User is Paid
Coefficients (SE) P-value Coefficients (SE) P-value Coefficients (SE) P-value Coefficients (SE) P-value
Severity 0.149 (0.171) 0.386 0.182 (0.168) 0.281 0.272 (0.102) 0.008 0.251 (0.102) 0.014
Personal -0.063 (0.161) 0.696 -0.090 (0.160) 0.576 -0.274 (0.104) 0.009 -0.246 (0.104) 0.019
Public -0.101 (0.165) 0.542 -0.131 (0.165) 0.430 -0.247 (0.102) 0.016 -0.236 (0.102) 0.021
Medical status 0.365 (0.133) 0.007 0.009 (0.081) 0.914
Education 0.066 (0.027) 0.017 0.004 (0.015) 0.811
Income 0.000 (0.000) 0.675 0.000 (0.000) 0.054
Age -0.008 (0.006) 0.150 0.006 (0.003) 0.105
Gender -0.020 (0.124) 0.870 0.033 (0.075) 0.659
Table 2: Model coefficients for predicting monetary value. Two models are shown per condition: One where only the exper-
imental conditions are used and the other where also user characteristics are included. Only non-censored observations are
used.
In many ways, the willingness to share your personal data
for personal and/or public use shares similarities with organ
donation, in the sense that people might be more willing to
share information with the possibility to help others if the
default is sharing of such data. Past work has shown that the
main difference among countries in the rates of organ dona-
tion can be explained not by kindness nor altruism, but in-
stead in the consent form and default option. In many coun-
tries, implementing an Opt Out Policy is the main reason of
an increase in the rate of organ donations (Johnson 2003).
Similarly, we hypothesize that if by default personal data
will be used for uses such as the ones outlined in this work,
and only if the user chooses to “opt out” will it be removed;
more often than not users will allow their information to be
analyzed, potentially helping the greater good.
Moreover, the likelihood of one choosing to be a living
liver donor increases significantly if a personal acquaintance
is in need of a liver or was in need of it (Papachristou et
al. 2004). This is similar to our results which indicate that
people who suffered from a medical condition themselves
were willing to pay more for the use of their data than those
who did not. However, care should be taken not to use data
only from those who are biased towards data donation, as
this could cause a bias in the models, both for the condition
that they are suffering from and in other conditions.
We believe that when people will be able to share their
personal data for medical uses, one of the barriers that may
prevent people from doing so will be the lack of supervi-
sion on the use of these data. This will be especially true if
the default for use of data will be opt in. Thus, we envision
an independent organization, similar to Institutional Review
Boards, which will oversee proper use of data. Such an orga-
nization will weigh the use of personal information against
the possibility of harm that can arise from its use; allowing
personal information to be used (and possibly shared) when
the greater cause outweighs the possible harm.
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Appendix: Full questionnaire and debrief
statement
Questionnaire
Demographic Questions:
• What year were you born?
• What is your gender?
- Male
- Female
- Other
- I prefer not to disclose
• In which country do you currently reside?
• What is the highest level of school you have completedor
the highest degree you have received?
- Less than high school diploma
- High school graduate
- Some college but no degree
- Associate degree in college (2 year)
- Bachelor’s degree in college (4 year)
- Master’s degree
- Doctoral degree
- Other
• What is your yearly income level?
- Less than 15,000$
- 15,000$-30,000$
- 30,000$-45,000$
- 45,000$-60,000$
- 60,000$-75,000$
- 75,000$-90,000$
- 90,000$-115,000$
- More than 115,000$
• Have you suffered from a serious medical condition in the
past year?
- Yes
- No
• Are you currently suffering from a serious medical condi-
tion?
- Yes
- No
Experimental condition:
(Each participant received only one question from the fol-
lowing):
• We want to measure and report the rate of flu virus in your
country.
• We want to develop a way to detect thyroid cancer by an-
alyzing your Bing or Google search queries and apply it
to people in your country.
• An algorithm will examine your data in order if it suggests
that you have thyroid cancer and report the results to you.
• We want to develop a way to detect thyroid cancer us-
ing your Bing or Google search queries. We will examine
your data in order to see if it suggests that you have thy-
roid cancer and report the results to you.
(Each participant received only one question from the fol-
lowing):
• To do so, we would like to purchase your Bing or Google
search queries in order to analyze them. We plan to recruit
1000 people to complete this questionnaire. Since we only
require 100 responses, we will only be contacting the 100
people who requested the least amount of money (as long
as it is less than our maximum). For how much money (in
US dollars) would you be willing to sell us your search
queries for analysis?
• To do so, we would like to analyze your Bing or Google
search queries.We plan to recruit 1000 people to complete
this questionnaire. Since we only need 100 responses, we
will contact the 100 people who were willing to pay the
largest amount of money (as long as it is more than our
minimum amount). How much money (in US dollars) are
you willing to pay so that we analyze your search queries?
Debrief statement
Thank you for your participation in our study! Your partici-
pation is greatly appreciated.
As we noted in the description of our study, recent ad-
vances in medical research have shown that it is possible to
diagnose serious medical conditions from the searches peo-
ple make online through services such as Google and Bing.
In the consent form of the study we informed you that the
purpose of our study was to recruit a large group of people
from whom we will collect their search history, which we
will use to improve our ability to discover medical condi-
tions.
In actuality, the goal of our study was to estimate the mon-
etary value that users place on data which can be used to as-
sist in medical research. The way in which the questionnaire
was structured is known to elicit truthful responses from
people, but the minimal prices we intended to offer were set
up so that no people could be recruited for the second stage
of the research.
Unfortunately, to properly test our hypothesis, we could
not reveal these details to you at the time of the experiment.
We hope that the results of our study will help us offer
these novel screening services to people around the world in
the near future. We thank you for helping us in understand-
ing the value people ascribe to these services.
